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Ratcliffe: Negotiability of Bills and Notes Secured by Collateral Agreements
NOTE AND COMMENT
Treating the latter quotation from the text as controlling,
even then the case helps us little in interpreting the Rossberg
case, or in clarifying the law as to admissions in Montana, because the Court does not suggest why the statement would not
be so admissible. It admits the statement on other grounds.
It should be realized that statements which are spontaneous
exclamations must automatically be admitted under principles of
evidence, though statements not admissible under evidence rules
should not be excluded automatically if there is agency involved.
The authority of the agent to make such statements, not merely
to do the act in connection with which the statements are made,
should be inquired into to determine whether or not they are admissible against the principal's interest under rules of agency
law. The term res gestae should be wholly repudiated as a principle of agency.
It is submitted that both the legal basis for, and the authority upon which the Callahan rule is predicated are so questionable that the Montana Supreme Court would be justified in reexamining the entire question of an agent's admissions against
his principal.
-Bill Hirst.

BILLS AND NOTES: NEGOTIABILITY OF BILLS AND
NOTES SECURED BY COLLATERAL AGREEMENTS
Uncertainty and confusion exist in Montana with respect
to the negotiability of instruments, otherwise negotiable, which
are secured by collateral agreements.' The extent of the confusion can best be determined by comparing the Montana decisions upon the subject with the rules formulated by the
weight of authority in other states. Clarity in presentation
of those rules demands a classification of the fact situations
with regard to the form of the instruments involved as follows:
(1) Instruments containing no reference to the collateral
agreement. (2) Instruments containing a mere reference to
'The word "secured" as used in this discussion extends not only to
those situations where a collateral agreement is given as security for
payment of a bill or note, but to the cases where the collateral agreement is the consideration for which the instrument is given or the
transaction giving rise to it.
No attempt is made herein to analyze the cases involving the right
of a transferee of a bill or note secured by a collateral agreement to
claim as a holder in due course where the agreement shows on its face
an infirmity in the bill or note or a defect in the title of the person
negotiating it.
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the collateral agreement. (3) Instruments containing upon
their face statements that they are "subject to" the collateral
agreement, or containing words of similar import. (4) Instruments which incorporate into their terms the conditions of the
collateral agreement.
In the cases where a bill or note was secured by a collateral
agreement without reference thereto the courts have generally
held the instrument negotiable.' Though all of the states have
adopted the rule of construction that several contracts relating
to the same matters, between the same parties, and made as
parts of substantially one transaction, should be construed together, the courts have steadfastly maintained that, in the absence of a reference to the collateral agreement upon the face
of a bill or note, they shall remain separate instruments for
the purpose of determining negotiability.!
The weight of authority holds an instrument negotiable
which contains upon its face a mere reference to a collateral
agreement as the consideration for which it was given, the
transaction out of which it arose, or the security for payment
of the debt.' In one case the note recited that "This note, including all installments thereof of even date herewith, is identified with a conditional sales agreement covering a certain
motor vehicle"'; in another case a rent note recited "Value
received in rent for store No. 443 Camp Street for month of
April, 1920, as per lease this date"'; in still another case a
'Hayward Lumber & Investment Co. v. Naslund (1932) 125 Cal. App.
34, 13 P. (2d) 775; Baird v. Meyer (1927) 55 N. D. 930, 215 N. W.
542, 56 A. L. R. 175.
8George A. Hubbard v. Robert B. Wallace Co. (1926) 201 Ia. 1143, 208
N. W. 730; 10 C. J. S., Bills and Notes, §44(b).
'Williamson v. Craig (1927) 204 Ia. 555, 215 N. W. 664; Davis v. Union
Planters Nat. Bank & Trust Co. (1937) 171 Tenn. 383, 103 S. W.(2d)
579. And for an unusual extension of the rule see the case of Camp
v. Dallas Nat. Bank of Dallas (1931) 36 S. W. (2d) 994. 7 AM. JuR.,
Bills and Notes, §112; 3 R. C. L., Bills and Notes, §110 and §112.
A statement on the face of an instrument that it is payable according to the tenor of a collateral agreement is generally held a mere reference. Campbell v. Equitable Securities Co. (1902) 17 Colo. App. 417,
68 P. 788. Contra: People v. Gould (1932) 347 Ill. 298, 179 N. E. 848
(The words "according to" were held equivalent to the words "subject
to" and rendered the note nonnegotiable.).
Slaughter v. Bank of Bisbee (1916) 17 Ariz. 484, 154 P. 1040 (Reference to "contract of even date" was written on face of note; held
negotiable.) ; Utah Irr. Co. v. Allen (1924) 64 Utah 511, 231 P. 818,
37 A. L. R. 651.
'Trice v. People's Loan & Investment Co. (1927) 173 Ark. 1160, 293 S.
W. 1037. Contra: Hamilton v. Vero Beach Reserve Mortgage Co.
(1932) 107 Fla. 65, 144 So. 362 (Words "identified with" held equivalent to the words "subject to.").
OTyler v. Whitney-Central Trust & Savings Bank (1924) 157 La. 249,
102 So. 325. Accord: International Finance Co. v. Northwestern Drug
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bill of exchange recited on its margin "Trade Acceptance. The
obligation of the acceptor of this bill arises out of the purchase
of goods from the drawer.'" In each case the court held that
the terminology used constituted a mere reference to the collateral agreement, the instruments remaining negotiable.
If reference is made to a collateral agreement by writing
upon the face of a bill or note the words "subject to," or words
of similar import, the instrument is nonnegotiable under the
almost universal rule.' But, in order to render a bill or note
subject to the collateral agreement, the words used must show
clearly and unequivocally that the drawer or maker intended
to burden the instrument with the conditions of the security.
The tendency of the courts since the Negotiable Instruments
Law has been to construe bills and notes in favor of negotiaCo. (D. C., 1922) 282 Fed. 920; Culbreath v. Guiterman, Rosenfield
& Co. (1927) 217 Ala. 259, 115 So. 303. Contra: Continental Bank &
Trust Co. v. Times Publishing Co. (1917) 142 La. 209, 76 So. 612,
L. R. A. 1918B, 632 ("as per", "in accordance with ", and "subject to"

given same effect) ; International Finance Corp. v. Calvert Drug Co.
(1924) 144 Md. 303, 124 A. 891, 23 A. L. R. 1162.
7McCornick & Co., Bankers v. Gem State Oil & Products Co. (1923) 38
Idaho 470, 222 P. 286, 34 A. L. R. 867. Accord: International Finance
Co. v. Northwestern Drug Co., supra note 6; First Bank of Marianna
v. Havana Canning Co. (1940) ...... Fla .......

,

195 So. 188; Arrington v.

Mercantile Protective Bureau, Inc. (Tex. Civ. App., 1930) 15 S. W.
(2d) 663.

8

Words "subject to" on face of instrument: Verner v. White (1926) 214
Ala. 550, 108 So. 369; Musto v. Grosjean (1929) 208 Cal. 453, 281 P.

1022; Gaines v. Fitzgibbons (1929) 168 La. 260, 121 So. 763; Fayetteville Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Crouch (1934) 115 W. Va. 651, 177 S. E.
532.
Words of similar import as the words "subject to": Commercial
Credit Co. v. Seymour Nat. Bank (1938) 105 Ind. 524, 15 N. E. (2d)
118 (Note recited "This note is deposited ... under the provisions of a
certain trust indenture . . . . This note to be valid must bear the

Trustee's certificate of authentication.") ; First Nat. Bank in Salem v.
Morgan (1930) 132 Ore. 515, 284 P. 582; 3 R. C. L., Bills and Notes,
§69.
If a bill or note recites that its maturity shall be in conformity

with the terms of a collateral agreement, the weight of authority holds
the instrument nonnegotiable. Westlake Mercantile Finance Corp. v.
Merritt (1928) 204 Cal. 673, 269 P. 620, 61 A. L. R. 811; First Nat.
Bank of Statesville, N. C. v. Power Equipment Co. (1930) 211 Ia. 153,
233 N. W. 103; Lane Co. v. Crum (Tex. Civ. App., 1927) 291 S. W.
1084. Contra: Heller v. Cuddy (1927) 172 Minn. 126, 214 N. W. 924.
A few jurisdictions distinguish between situations where the words
"subject to" or words of similar import are inserted in the body of the
bill or note and where the same words are written over or around the

body of the instrument. Newman v. Schwarz (1934) 180 La. 153, 156
So. 206.
There is a tendency of the courts to hold an instrument negotiable
which is subjected to the terms of a collateral agreement, if those
terms are not incompatible with negotiability. Krause v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co. (1939) 172 Misc. 2, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 206.
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bility, resolving all doubts accordingly.! In the case of Lubin
v. Pressed Steel Car Co.' an instrument was held negotiable
which recited that it was "issued under and . .. secured by an
Indenture... to which reference is hereby made for a statement
of the rights of the holders . . . ", the court going as far as reason and precedent would allow to favor negotiability.
If the provisions of a collateral agreement are incorporated
bodily into the terms of an instrument otherwise negotiable, and
are of such character that they render the order or promise conditional or uncertain, there is no doubt that the negotiability
of the instrument is destroyed." The weight of authority holds
an instrument nonnegotiable which provides that the conditions
of a collateral agreement "shall be incorporated," or other
words to that effect." However, the tendency of the courts today is to hold instruments negotiable which incorporate by reference the conditions of a collateral agreement, if those conditions are not incompatible with negotiability.' It is submitted
that the weight of authority rule is the better. The principle is
undisputed that a negotiable bill or note must carry upon its
face the entire contract of the parties thereto, and it is impossible to say that the principle is complied with where the instrument upon its face requires the owner or holder to take note of
the terms and conditions of another agreement to ascertain the
complete order or promise."
The rules discussed apply with equal effect whether a bill
or note is secured by a mortgage on real estate," a chattel mort'McCornick & Co. v. Gem State Oil & Products Co., supra note 7; First
Nat. Bank in Salem v. Morgan, 8upra note 8; 10 C. J. S., BiU8 and
Note8, §42(c).
"°(1933) 146 Misc. 462, 263 N. Y. S. 433. The instrument involved in
this case was a corporate bond; but it is now settled that the rules
as to the negotiability of bills and notes are applicable to bonds of

all kinds.

BRANNAN,

NInOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

LAW

(6th ed. 1938),

§1, p. 107; SMITH & MOORE, CASES ON BILLS AND NOTES (4th ed.), footnote p. 1.
"Kerr v. Staufer (1927) 52 S. D. 223, 217 N. W. 211.
"Detroit Trust Co. v. Detroit City Service Co. (1932) 262 Mich. 14, 247
N. W. 76 (Note referred to trust deed "as though it were recited herein.") ; King Cattle Co. v. Joseph (1924) 158 Minn. 481, 198 N. W. 798.
Contra: Ferring v. Verwey (1930) 200 Wis. 631, 229 N. W. 46. For a
complete discussion of the doctrine of incorporation see 13 NOTRE DAME
L. R. 133.
"Gerrish v. Atlantic Ice & Coal Co. (1935) 80 F.(2d) 648; Mortgage
Bond Co. v. Stephens (1937) 181 Okla. 182, 72 P.(2d) 831.
'"For further discussion of the subject see 104 A. L. R. 1378; 75 A. L. R.
1210; 45 A. L. R. 1074. The California law is digested in 22 CALIF.
L. REV. 677.
"First Nat. Bank of Birmingham v. De Jernett (1935) 229 Ala. 564,
159 So. 73.
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gage," a deed of trust,7 a conditional sales contract,' an escrow
agreement," a pledge agreement," or other type of collateral
contract.0
In Montana the controversy as to the effect of the execution
of a collateral agreement upon the negotiability of a bill or note
originated with the case of Cornish v. Woolverton, decided in
1905. In that case the note recited "This note and these coupons . . . are secured by mortgage of even date herewith, .... "
The mortgage contained provisions for the payment by the
mortgagor of taxes, liens and incumbrances, and insurance premiums upon the premises mortgaged, and stated that, upon default in the payment thereof, the mortgagee should pay the
charges and add the amount so paid to the debt secured. The
note was held nonnegotiable. The court reasoned that the note
and mortgage constituted a single contract under the rule of
construction declared by the Civil Code" that several contracts
relating to the same matters and executed at substantially the
same time must be taken together, that the promise to pay was
burdened with the conditions of the mortgage as to anyone taking the note with notice of the mortgage, and that the mere reference upon the face of the note sufficed to put every holder
thereof upon notice of the mortgage, ipso facto destroying the
negotiability of the note.
In the case of Buhler et al. v. Loftus et al.," decided in 1917,
a note, otherwise negotiable, was secured by a mortgage upon
realty; subsequently the payee indorsed the note without recourse and transferred it and the mortgage to the defendant by
a written assignment. No reference to the mortgage appeared
upon the face of the note. T)he maker of the note sued to cancel
it and the mortgage for the alleged fraud of the payee. The
note was held nonnegotiable in the hands of the defendant transferee, the court stating that
"It did ... not come into his hands as a courier without
"Cook v. Parks (1933) 46 Ga. App. 749, 169 S. E. 208.
'TCommercial Credit Co. v. Seymour Nat. Bank, supra note 7.
"Legal Loan & Investment Ass'n. v. Arnold (1941) ...... Mo ........ 150 S. W.
(2d) 544; Shawano Finance Corp. v. Julius (1934) 214 Wis. 637, 254
N. W. 355.
2"Williams v. Silverstein (1931) 213 Cal. 269, 2 P. (2d) 165.
Jewell v. Norrell (1941) 65 Ga. 862, 16 S. E.(2d) 797.
"Newman v. Schwarz, supra note 8 (rent note) ; First Nat. Bank in
Salem v. Morgan, supra note 8 (stock subscription contract) ; Coleman
v.
Valentin (1917) 39 S. D. 323, 164 N. W. 67 (land contract); McCarty v. Allen (Tex. Civ. App., 1938) 113 S. W.(2d) 974 (vendor's

lien).

'32 Mont. 456, 81 P. 4, 108 Am. St. Rep. 598.
'Civil Code 1895, §2207; R. C. M. 1935, §7533.

"53 Mont. 546, 165 P. 601.
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luggage, but as a nonnegotiable instrument, subject to
all equities existing in favor of J. M. Buhler (plaintiff)
at the time he (defendant) received it."
The decision turned upon the provision of the Civil Code' that
the recovery of a debt or the enforcement of a right secured
by a mortgage must be by foreclosure of the mortgage. The
court reasoned that a note secured by a mortgage was nonnegotiable in the hands of one who took it with notice of the
mortgage, that the written assignment of the note and mortgage gave the transferee sufficient notice of the mortgage,
and that the defendant took the note as a mortgage note, collectible only by foreclosure, contrary to the inherent character
of a negotiable instrument. Noteworthy is the fact that the
court said its decision was based upon the express holding of
the Cornish Case, although the court in the Cornish Case refused to discuss the section of the statute which was held controlling in the Buhler Case.
The court in Buhler v. Loftus did not decide what the
rights of a subsequent indorsee of the note without notice of
the mortgage would be. This question remained unanswered
until the decision in the case of Wood v. Ferguson et al." in
1924, which case reaffirmed the rule of the Buhler Case to the
extent that it held a note nonnegotiable in the hands of an indorsee with notice of the mortgage security, but added that, if
the instrument were indorsed by him to one who had no knowledge of the mortgage, the latter could claim as a holder in due
course. The decision is worthy of note because the court for the
first time applied the test of notice of the mortgage to determine
the position of the transferee as a holder in due course, instead
of to determine the negotiability of the note. But, in Barnes et
al. v. Rowles et al.,. decided in 1929, the court, in determining
that the defendant payee was not liable as indorser of a note
which he had indorsed in blank and delivered with an assignment
of the mortgage to plaintiffs, held the Cornish and Buhler cases
decisive, saying that "Under the authorities cited, the notes are
nonnegotiable. "
Summarizing these decisions, we must conclude: (1) An instrument secured by a mortgage is burdened with the conditions
of the mortgage in the hands of anyone who has knowledge of its
existence, whether the knowledge is acquired by a reference upon
'Revised Codes 1907, §6861; R. C. M. 1935, §9467.
"71 Mont. 540, 230 P. 592.
"84 Mont. 393, 276 P. 15, 79 A. L. R. 717. The cause of action in this
case arose before the 1923 amendment, infra in body of article, went
into effect.
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the face of the instrument or by actual notice where no reference
is made to the collateral agreement. (2) An instrument which
is nonnegotiable in the hands of one with notice of the mortgage
may be held negotiable in the hands of a subsequent indorsee
without notice of the mortgage.
The immediate result of the decisions in the Cornish and
Buhler cases was a commercial dilemma; if a bill or note was
secured by a collateral agreement, there was a grave possibility
that it would be held nonnegotiable even though it did not refer
to the security; on the other hand, the absence of collateral security increased the difficulty of discounting the instrument.
Apparently intending to remedy that situation, the legislature
in 1923 amended the Revised Codes of 1921, Section 8412, by adding subdivision 5 which provides:
"An instrument otherwise negotiable in character is not affected by the fact that it was at the time of the execution
or subsequently secured by mortgage on real or personal
property."
It is submitted that the amendment clarifies the situation in
but one important aspect: It should prevent further application, in the determination of the negotiability of an instrument
secured by a mortgage, of the statutory requirement that every
debt secured by mortgage shall be enforced by foreclosure. But,
consider the questions, all judicially unanswered at present,
which may reasonably be expected to arise in applying the
amended statute. Should an instrument which contains no reference to a mortgage given to secure it now be held negotiable
in the hands of a person who takes it with knowledge of the
mortgage ?' What will be the effect upon the negotiability of a
bill or note of a mere reference therein to a mortgage? What
effect has a reference which subjects the instrument to a mortgage? What of a reference which incorporates into the instrument the terms of a mortgage? Does the amendment apply regardless of the form of the mortgage, or must the security adhere to the statutory form of mortgage? Are the rules formulated with respect to mortgage instruments applicable in determining the negotiability of instruments secured by other forms
of collateral agreements? A careful analysis of the phraseology
of the 1923 amendment leads to the conclusion that, regardless
of the intention of the legislature, the amendment fails to provide a ready answer to these relevant questions.
'See Barnes v. Rowles, supra note 27, containing indecesive dictum that
"The amendment was evidently made for the purpose of obviating the
result of the decisions" in the Cornish and Buhler cases.
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It is submitted, therefore, that the rule of the Cornish Case
remains unaltered, and future decisions upon the subject must
turn entirely upon the acceptance or rejection of the sine qua
non of that decision-upon the effect to be given the statutory
p.ovision that "Several contracts relating to the same matters,
between the same parties, and made as parts of substantially
one transaction, are to be taken together,' in the determination
of the negotiability of bills and notes secured by collateral agreements. It must be remembered that the law of negotiable instruments arose and developed as an inherent part of the law
merchant, that the Negotiable Instruments Law was substantially a copy of the English Act which codified the law merchant, and that the Negotiable Instruments Law, the purpose of
which was to secure uniformity of holdings throughout the United States, has been adopted by the state of Montana.' So, although a bill or note and a collateral agreement executed to secure it must be construed together in conformity with the statutory rule of construction, the negotiability of the instruments
and the status of the indorsee thereof as a holder in due course
should be determined solely by the rules stated by the Negotiable
Instruments Law. Only by properly blending the precedents of
the law merchant with the requirements of modern commercial
enterprise can workable rules be formulated to determine the negotiability of instruments secured by collateral agreements. The
present rules in this state are definitely unsatisfactory, and it
is to be hoped that the situation will be promptly remedied by
legislative enactment or judicial interpretation overruling the
decision of the Cornish Case and establishing the following principles: (1) A bill or note, otherwise negotiable, should not be
held nonnegotiable simply because it is secured by a collateral
agreement. (2) Only when the order or promise is burdened
with the conditions of a collateral agreement should the instrument be rendered nonnegotiable; an instrument which is made
subject to the terms of a collateral agreement should be held
nonnegotiable; an instrument which bodily incorporates the
terms of a collateral agreement should be held negotiable unless
the order or promise to pay is rendered conditional or uncertain;
and an instrument which incorporates the terms of a collateral
agreement by stating that the said terms "shall be incorporated
herein," or words to that effect, should be held nonnegotiable.
(3) An instrument which contains a mere reference to a collateral agreement as the consideration fdr which it was given, as
"Supra, note 23.
3iCh. 121 LAws OF

MONTANA

1903; R. C. M. 1935, §§8401-8597, inclusive.
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the transaction out of which it arose, or as the security for payment of the debt, is not burdened with the conditions of the
agreement and should be held negotiable. (4) These rules
should be applied with equal effect whether a bill or note is secured by a mortgage or by any other form of collateral agreement. (5) Notice of the existence or terms of a collateral agreement, of itself, should not prevent the transferee of a bill or note
from taking it as a holder in due course."
-Arthur T. Ratcliffe.

CONTRACTS: RIGHTS OF PERSONS NOT A PARTY
TO A CONTRACT TO SUE IN MONTANA
The question of the rights of a third party to sue upon what
are commonly styled contracts for the benefit of third parties
continues to be a subject of litigation in Montana.1 In a recent
Montana case, Kelley v. Montana Power Company' which the
Court stated involved a contract for the benefit of a third party,
the beneficiary failed in a suit against the defendant corporation which the Court treated as the promisee of a contract for
the benefit of a third party! The Court's dictum is that the
beneficiary would have a cause of action under section 7472,
R. C. M. 1935 against the promisor.'
The foregoing section reads:
"A contract made expressly for the benefit of a third
person may be enforced by him at any time before the parties thereto rescind it."
Under this provision there has been much litigation in Montana as to the liability of the promisor to the beneficiary. The
beneficiaries fall by definition into three classes: (1) incidental,
'Of course, one who takes a bill or note with notice of the terms of a
collateral agreement which disclose an infirmity in the bill or note or a
defect in the title of the person negotiating it does not become a holder
in due course under the provisions of R. C. M. 1935, §§8459(4), 8461,
and 8463, although the bill or note is negotiable in form. However, as
pointed out supra, note 1, this comment does not deal with cases involving that situation.
'This note is primarily concerned with the rights of the beneficiary to
sue the promisor and not with the various defenses that the promisor
may set up in a suit.
'(October 16, 1940) 111 Mont. 118, 106 P. (2d) 339.
'The terms of the contract are not set forth in the case; hence, it is
Impossible to tell whether it involves a contract for the benefit of a
third person about which there may be some question.
'See 111 Mont. 118, 122, 106 P. (2d) 339, 340.
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